Public Concerns of Illegal Immigration and Ideology by Gulotty, Robert
 Gulotty 1
 
Public Concerns of Illegal Immigration and Ideology 
 
A Senior Honors Thesis 
 
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for graduation with research 
distinction in Political Science in the undergraduate college of The Ohio State University 
 
By 
 
Robert Gulotty 
 
February 2008 
Project Advisor: Professor Michael Neblo, Department of Political Science
 Gulotty 2
Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, dominate directly the actions of men. Yet the 
"images of the world" created by these ideas have very often served as switches 
determining the tracks on which the dynamism of interests kept actions moving.  
 –Max Weber1
 
How does affective response to Hispanics relate to restrictionist border policy 
proposals?  I argue a form of ideologically mediated pro- or anti-Hispanic affect better 
explains restrictionist sentiment than a variety of competing theories of immigration 
politics.  Such alternative viewpoints include the realistic threat hypothesis, the “security 
dilemma” framework, “principled conservativism,” and finally, symbolic racism 
originating from the protestant ethic and unfiltered negative affect toward Hispanics.  In 
contrast to these theories that take up structural features of economics, interethnic 
conflict, or disputes of ideology as the cause of insecurity, I argue that ideology acts as an 
enabling device that determines whether the negative affect will result in certain 
justifications for restrictionist immigration policy.   
Insecurity, a primary affective correlate of restrictionist sentiment, comes in 
several forms, and it is often difficult to draw significant lines.  We feel insecure when 
approached by a stranger, hear of a newly discovered virus, or find ourselves with the 
specter of unemployment.  Fear is famously disproportional to the probability of the 
threat, we fear shark attacks but not undertow, snipers on the highway but not distracted 
drivers.  Certain phenomena trigger a psychological response that make the rational 
calculation of threat more difficult, and can influence even the perception of the size of 
threat in the first place.  Measuring the perceived size of a threat therefore runs into a 
                                                 
1 29 Max Weber, Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie, trans. Marianne Weber 
(Tübingen, Germany: J.C.B. Mohr, 1920).,p. 252 
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problem, if it is perceived, it will probably be exaggerated, thus confounding attempts to 
demonstrate the relative urgency of response to assuage the threat in the first point. 
Recently, scholars have rushed to explain both the increased feelings of insecurity 
related to the status or intent of undocumented immigrants, America’s southern border, 
the success of immigrant assimilation and cultural issues.  One strain of argument centers 
on a conception of racial relations framed in zero-sum relationships of power or interest.  
Such scholars argue that structural features of societies that limit enforcement of 
agreements encourage insecurity.  The ‘security dilemma’ framework is not opposed to 
but rather along side explanations of immigration policy preferences that rely on 
ideology, group identity, or current material interests.  The ‘security dilemma’ emphasis 
on threats to individuals security, posits that particular groups of immigrants are targeted 
because of their perceived propensity to cause a breakdown in the state. 
In Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma, Mikhail Alexseev2 explains 
fear of immigration by appeal to rational decision making on the part of the incumbent 
population.  Alexseev noticed a tendency to exaggerate and strongly respond to threats 
even in contexts of marginal immigration, which indicates that anti-immigrant sentiment 
is not be explained by conflict over resources or similar population based threats.  
Instead, it is the expectation of future interaction that results in exaggerated threat of 
conflict, hence a dilemma where we have an exaggerated threat that arrives from rational 
expectation. 
The “security dilemma” conceptualization of threat, which de-couples perceived 
physical insecurity from its “putative symbolic and realistic correlates”, identifies the 
                                                 
2 Alexeev, Mikhail A. Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma 2006 Cambridge University Press. 
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structural causes of fear of immigrants.3  Alexseev uses Weingasts’ “reciprocal 
vulnerability game” which stipulates that in situations of approximately equal group size 
and political power, there is a lack of credible commitment to cooperate because of 
incentives to break any agreements and the propensity to act selfishly.  Alexeev argues 
that regardless of the non-equality of the populations involved, there cannot be any 
credible commitment on the side of the incoming migrants not to “defect” and play 
offensive strategies, Americans rightly (rationally) suspect them and establish the 
incoming migrants as threatening.4  This suspicion instantiates itself in the perception of 
illegal immigrant disloyalty, unfaithfulness and increased concern about terrorism.5
The perception of threat from the ‘sucker’s payoff’ increases with the lack of 
contract enforcement, for example when the state is relatively weak.  Similar to a 
Hobbesian theory of human nature, this claim also comports with literature on threat 
construction and exaggeration, often applied to international relations.  Rather than an 
iterated game, as interactions of citizens under a stable government would be, migrants 
are a series of ‘one shot games’.   “The shadow of doubt is perpetually there, as long as 
any given migrant- regardless of past behavior – has a plausible incentive to break the 
pattern of cooperative (“defensive”) behavior.”6  Human nature, being risk-averse, 
exaggerates this threat into something requiring policy response.   
The security dilemma explains fear of objectively marginal immigration 
populations, and Alexeev analyzes the race relations within the United States during the 
racial conflict in Southern California during the early 1990’s.  With the immigration 
                                                 
3 Alexeev, Mikhail A. Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma 2006 pg 27. 
4 Alexeev, Mikhail A. Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma 2006 pg 54. 
5 Alexeev, pg 55. 
6 Alexeev pg 54. 
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population under question hardly marginal, increasingly in central and northern states, it 
is a legitimate question whether the security dilemma applies.7  The perception of threat 
posed by the obscured intent of the migrants would presumably increase with rapid 
population increases that result from the current migration trends.   
There are several features of the current migration situation that may even 
encourage these phenomena.  The feeling of lack of control, like the feeling of a lack of 
order, generates anxiety.  People are therefore more likely to exaggerate risks when those 
risks are beyond their control.8  This is particularly applicable today given the failure to 
control the global economic system.  In addition, the proximity of underdeveloped states 
such as Mexico makes the southern border particularly troubling.  However, it is 
important to keep in mind, that these conceptions need not accurately reflect the situation. 
It is more important that the conceptions be coherent and provide sufficient explanations 
for social phenomena, but not so important for them to comport with an actual lack in 
state authority. 
Former Security official and author Robert Johnson developed a theory which 
predicts that actual authority status may not influence the choice of security threats, but 
rather the subjective perception of the threatening group.  Threats originating from places 
outside the established ordered and developed world have long been focal points of 
analysis of international relations. “Analysts have usually argued or assumed that the 
elements of order in the world emanated from European civilization while the rest of the 
world was exotic and mysterious at best and a zone of cruelty and perpetual chaos at 
                                                 
7 Reuters “Illegal immigrants increasingly go north” Jan 15, 2008 Robin Emmott  
8 Johnson. R.  Improbable Dangers, U.S. conceptions of Threat in the Cold War 1997 Pg. 16  
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worst.”9 This kind of analysis is not limited to the ivory tower; in recent hearings held by 
the House Homeland Security Subcommittee on security in the southern border, argued 
that “It's not clear that the groups who are moving any kind of illegal traffic, whether it 
be human, narcotics, terrorist or anything else, behave in zones [sic] like we behave.”10  
This rhetoric, common from the Cold War to the Global War on Terror, highlights fear of 
the non-European world.  Is this conception of world order a ‘security dilemma or a false 
dilemma driven by racial and ethnic prejudice? 
According to security dilemma theories, ‘zones of insecurity’ and lack of control 
are (legitimately or not) treated as military threats.  Alexeev cites Patrick Buchanan: “the 
reconquista of Alta California by Mexico is well advanced and the great question is now 
on the table.  Will the American Southwest become a giant Kosovo…”11 But why focus 
on illegal immigrants primarily from a state that cannot compete militarily, economically 
or socially with the United States on the world stage.  In Weber’s words, what are the 
‘switches’ which turn general anxiety upon illegal immigrant populations? The Security 
Dilemma logic would suggest that it is the perceived inherent unpredictability of 
populations without prior behavior or history to placate concern.  
I propose that the perceived threat from illegal immigrants arises from an 
ideologically mediated affective response to the ethnic and racial makeup of the incoming 
population, rather than inability to commit to future behavior.  On this hypothesis, 
assenting to restrictionist arguments for limiting or eliminating illegal immigration would 
be highly correlated with affective attitudes about Hispanics.  Current population trends 
                                                 
9 Holsti K. J. The coming chaos?  Armed conflict in the world’s periphery”  International Order and the 
Future of World Politics 1999 Cambridge  Edited by T. V. Paul and John A. Hall. Pg. 283 
10 Rep. Simmons, “Panel I Of A Hearing Of The Subcommittee On Intelligence, Information Sharing, And 
Terrorism Risk Assessment Of The House Committee On Homeland Security” June 28, 2006  
11 Buchanan Patrick Pg. 12 
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demonstrate that Latino immigrants are a considerable force in American racial relations.  
Now the nation’s largest minority group, Latinos accounted for one half of the overall 
population growth of 2.9 million between 2003 and 2004.  The Census Bureau estimates 
there were 41.3 million Latinos in the United States as of July 2004.12  Despite the non-
trivial political and social implications of large shifts in population, I contend racial 
prejudice holding constant material concerns and ideology drive the restrictionist 
sentiment in regards to illegal immigration. 
Symbolic racism theory argues positions on policy regarding race relations 
originate in a blend of racial affect and conservative values, particularly individualism.  
Does symbolic racism explain the threat perceived from illegal immigrants?  I argue a 
similar construction of ideology and anti-illegal and anti-Hispanic affect determines the 
strength of threat to culture.  Namely, having ideology subsidizes the search for a cover 
for expressing racial affect.  If Alexseev is correct and this affect is a response to the 
perceived threat of the overthrow of the power maintained by the status quo white 
majority, then perception of the rate of immigrant takeover would correlate positively 
with perceived threat to culture. 
Alexseev has two potential responses to this line of reasoning.   Population is not 
necessarily a feature of his analysis of the ‘security dilemma’, as marginal immigration 
populations primarily motivate his study.  Further, in many cases where population trends 
tangibly threaten the majority status of ethnic incumbents, they do not necessarily 
engender hostility and violence.  Second, he seeks to avoid some of the methodological 
issues highlighted during the 1990’s about the measurement of symbolic racism. 
Symbolic threat “defined as threat to group identity – and this term would encompass all 
                                                 
12 LeMay, Michael C. Guarding the Gates Immigration and National Security. 2006 pg. 255 
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the opinion measures that in the Kinder/Sears-Sniderman/Tetlock debate would relater 
primarily to either symbolic or old-fashioned racism.”13  I argue that this, perhaps crude 
measure, will be more successful than security dilemma claims.  
Immigration phobia arises in cases of marginal migration, what is the role of 
population in threat formation?  First it is unclear that population can be ruled out as an 
important factor in threat construction, the Alexseev’s examples of the UAE, Kuwait and 
Oman non-withstanding.  Alexseev used the outbreak of violence as the dependent 
variable, rather than opinion polling, to argue that rapid population shifts are not the 
defining feature of backlash to immigration.  In contrast, symbolic racism theorists would 
argue that individuals use arguments about political ideology in replacement of outwardly 
anti-minority policy.  Second, while it is the case that population shifts and totals are not 
key variable in the security dilemma hypothesis, exaggerated perception of shifts are key 
predictions to explain phobia of marginal migration.  I use perception of population size 
and movement as a measure of the particular threat of anarchy to break out.  I use 
exaggeration of threat as the measure because such exaggeration is one key similarity 
across societies where the Security dilemma logic obtains.  Finally, while large 
populations may not always bring about threats, one of the key points of debate in the 
United States has been the ability to measure the population size and spread, the failure of 
government agencies to do so is one mark for the weakness of the federal government 
that explains the threat initially.
As discussed above, Alexseev’s explanation of the link between threat and 
immigration relies on the marginal populations’ propensity to produce anarchy, rather 
than their relative size.  On the other hand, according to Alexseev, symbolic threats, or 
                                                 
13 Alexeev, M. Immigration Phobia and the Security Dilemma.  pg. 15 
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threats based on group identity or racial identity, implicitly rely on relative population.  
He argues larger populations pose correspondingly larger threats to the actual identities 
regardless of threat to resources.  To analyze this propensity of population estimates to 
determine attitude I included in my model a variable which takes the answer to following 
two questions: 
 
About how many illegal immigrants do you think currently reside in the 
United States? '. 
 
1 '100,000' 
2 '4,000,000' 
3 '12,000,000' 
4 '23,000,000' 
5 '96,000,000' 
6 'Don't know'. 
 
Variable labels bas10b 'BAS10B: Do you know about how many new illegal 
immigrants come into the U.S. each year?  '. 
 
1 '50,000' 
2 '200,000' 
3 '500,000' 
4 '2,000,000' 
5 '10,000,000' 
6 'Don't know'. 
 
 I then took as data whether the answer was an overestimate or an underestimate, 
using the higher or lower amount as two new variables, ‘Est. Illegal Here’ and ‘Est. 
Illegal Arrival” to determine the strength of the population exaggeration in the 
respondents, and to determine this population exaggerations correlation with responses 
on various levels of threat.  In this model, I test fears of balkanization of culture using 
these estimates of population, adding the standard battery of political knowledge and 
education levels, in addition to a scale which measures the number of correct answers in a 
series of immigration question, to help delineate between incorrect answers and 
exaggerated answers.  
MODEL SPECIFICATION INFORMATION 
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 Most of this paper relies on measuring the reasons people have for positions on 
illegal immigration.  To form variables for culture, jobs, terrorism and the economy, I 
combined the following battery of questions into pairs, with the index being = A - B. 
Law   
A 
Allowing any illegal immigrants to become citizens sets a bad 
precedent by rewarding people for breaking the law. 
B 
Allowing some illegal immigrants to eventually become citizens 
recognizes that most of them are otherwise law-abiding neighbors. 
Jobs   
A 
The government should not make things worse for those struggling 
economically by allowing millions of illegal immigrants to compete for 
jobs. 
B 
Most illegal immigrants are highly motivated people who contribute to 
the economy through hard work, often in jobs that citizens do not 
want. 
Economy   
A 
We cannot afford the taxes necessary to provide services like 
education and health care for illegal immigrants. 
B 
Illegal immigrants pay taxes like the rest of us, so they should be able 
to get services like education and health care. 
Culture   
A 
If illegal immigration trends continue, English will no longer be our 
common language. Without a common language, the U.S. will break 
into separate cultures. 
B 
America has always been a nation of immigrants, with each new 
wave adding to the diversity and richness of our culture. The most 
recent wave of immigrants is no different. 
Terrorism   
A 
The large flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. makes it easy for 
terrorists to enter the country unchallenged. 
B 
Terrorism and illegal immigration are completely different issues, with 
completely different solutions. 
 
The pairings above have similar subject matter, in addition to being, among the variables 
in question, the only possible pairings with statistically significant correlation in the 
correct direction, where for example question one is highly correlated with question two, 
it is only statistically significantly negatively correlated with the answers to question 
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eight.  This pair of question one and the inverse of question eight becomes the variable 
for “Law.”   
 In order to test the relationship between exaggeration and reasons for positions on 
immigration, I specified a model that held age, gender, education, place of residence, 
household income, and knowledge about immigration and political matters constant.  The 
choice of variables for age, education, income, economic outlook, ideology, “border 
state” and “living in the south” come directly from Burns and Gimpel.14  The present data 
come from a study of deliberative behavior, and the treatment variable controls for a 
document of background materials on immigration that was provided to the participants 
in the survey.   
Regression printout for "Culture"   Number of obs= 948 
    F(17, 930) =  18.64 
    Prob > F  =  0.0000 
     R-squared =  0.2541 
     
Adj R-squared =  
0.2405 
     Root MSE =  3.4059   
          
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error T P>|t| 
Overestimation of Illegal pop. 
Here. 0.3001 0.135779 2.21 0.027
Overestimation of Illegal pop. 
Incoming 0.1416 0.113917 1.24 0.214
Age in Categories 0.2727 0.081999 3.33 0.001
Hispanic Ethnicity -2.0971 0.436984 -4.80 0.000
Household Income in Categories -0.0261 0.029497 -0.89 0.376
Education in Categories -0.5944 0.157859 -3.77 0.000
Live in border state 0.6031 0.226221 2.67 0.008
Live in South 0.0042 0.229611 0.02 0.986
Republican 0.5886 0.297017 1.98 0.048
Democrat -0.6880 0.284702 -2.42 0.016
                                                 
14 Peter Burns; James G. Gimpel “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on 
Immigration Policy” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 2. (Summer, 2000), pp. 201-225 
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Ideology 0.6793 0.090354 7.52 0.000
Immigration knowledge -0.1180 0.090393 -1.31 0.192
Political knowledge -0.1925 0.144599 -1.33 0.183
Economic outlook for self  -0.3715 0.16859 -2.20 0.028
Economic outlook for nation 0.0534 0.169637 0.31 0.753
Treatment -0.0557 0.227678 -0.24 0.807
Gender 0.1482 0.243079 0.61 0.542
Constant 7.3216 1.080745 6.77 0.000
 
 As expected, responses of agreement with the statement that illegal immigrants pose a 
risk to culture is correlated with overestimates in the number of illegal immigrants in the 
U.S., but not with the relative number of those crossing the border.  This seems to 
indicate that the dependent variable picks up what we intuitively consider 
 As Alexeev rightly points out in his book, and as Johnson argued in regards to the 
threat of communism during the cold war, anxiety ought to result in exaggeration of 
threat.  Exaggeration of the numbers of illegal immigrants is a symptom of some 
underlying anxiety, but is this anxiety of resources, culture, or anarchy? 
Coefficients: Culture Terrorism Economy Jobs Law 
Est. Illegal Here 0.3001* 0.3057** 0.2359  0.0657  0.3441** 
Est. Illegal Arrival 0.1416 0.03112  0.1453  0.2550** 0.2001 
      
** .01      
* .05      
 
Using the model described above with Culture, Terrorism, Economy, Jobs and 
Law as the dependent variable, we come up with some telling results.  Terrorism, or the 
breakdown of borders, correlates statistically well with overestimates of the number of 
illegal immigrants here, whereas the question about allowing illegal immigrants to 
compete with American workers is correlated well with overestimates of the number of 
illegal immigrants who are arriving, but not the other way around. 
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The model with the terrorism dependent variable shows that the variance of 
exaggerated illegal populations in the U.S. explains part of the variance of peoples 
concerns about “The large flow of illegal immigrants,” and the ease of “terrorists to enter 
the country unchallenged.”  If actual destabilization of the border was driving the 
exaggeration of illegal immigrant populations, a sign of fear on an issue, it would be 
manifest in the overestimate of the number crossing the border, but it seems the variance 
of perceptions of incumbent illegal population covaries with terrorism, rather than the 
variance of the overestimation of those coming in.  I argue that these data indicate that 
the perception of destabilization of the border is not a result of rational consideration of 
population movements or even rational calculation of exaggerated population 
movements, but rather a problem implicating government competence within the country. 
The variable measuring response to questions on jobs also highlights an 
unexpected direction of threat exaggeration.  The Jobs variable specifically implicates the 
government failure, “allowing them to compete.”  The question wording asks the 
respondent whether or not “Most illegal immigrants are highly motivated people who 
contribute to the economy through hard work, often in jobs that citizens do not want.” 
The question highlights the motivations of illegal immigrants.  Were Alexseev’s thesis to 
apply in this case, this should correspond well with overestimates of the illegal 
immigrants who are in the country, as it is their future behavior or motives that cannot be 
guaranteed in a “reciprocal vulnerability game.”  However, this is not the case, and as 
mentioned earlier, the overestimation of incumbent illegal populations do not correlate 
significantly with the jobs question.  
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IDEOLOGY  
The famous polymath Jules Henri Poincaré argued, “It is not nature which 
imposes [time and space] upon us, it is we who impose them upon nature because we find 
them convenient.”15  That is to say that the world that we experience, and in particular 
space, may be subject to ‘convenient’ heuristics that help filter information and arrive at 
policy positions.  In this regard, I argue ideology about what the role of property, 
citizenship, and freedom filters our affective responses to illegal immigration, which then 
predicts our policy positions.  By implicating illegal immigrants in some sort of violation 
of the ideology related to personal property claims, our personal territory, our home, an 
emotional and exaggerated response may follow independent of the actual use of space or 
resources by the migrants.  As Patrick Buchanan puts it in his book State of Emergency,  
 
Here in America, the self-delusion about what is happening and the paralysis in 
the face of the crisis have no precedent.  What can be said for a man who would 
allow his home to be invaded by strangers who demanded they be fed, clothed, 
housed, and granted the rights of the firstborn?16
 
In this highly rhetorical flourish, the threat of illegal immigrants is not being framed as a 
general economic cost, or a general increase in taxes that changes, say, inflation rates, but 
right at the heart of the matter, one’s own home and family.  In a chapter entitled “Who is 
at the Door?” The language of personal space and immediate surroundings continues:   
“But millions bring no allegiance to America and remain loyal to the lands of their birth.  
And though they occupy more and more rooms in our home, they are not part of our 
family.”17   The dichotomy between this land, our home and our people must be clearly 
defined in order to say that the immigrants are not our people and, more importantly, that 
                                                 
15 Valeur de la Science (The Value of Science) (1904) 
16 Buchanan P. State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America 2006 Pg. 6 
17 Buchanan P. Pg. 13 
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they should go back to their own homes.  To Buchanan, the fact that they are here means 
our own homes are under threat.  In an example in his book, The Death of the West, an 
American says “I’ve lost my freedom. I can’t ever leave the house unless I have 
somebody watch it… We had Mexicans working on our property… Now, it’s hell…”18
Not just restrictionists use this rhetoric of homes and personal space.  In a series 
of speeches before the elections in which he promoted liberalized immigration policy, 
President Bush agued that “a lot of people have come here to this country over the 
decades with a dream, you know. Some of them it's as simple as "I'd like to own my own 
house." Or, "I want to work hard so my child can go to college."”19  Bush further argues 
that illegal immigrants often are “doing jobs Americans aren't doing, providing for their 
families, they own their home.”20  The presumed implication is that we ought not to 
worry about “people who have been here for, say, a decade, who have paid their taxes 
and built a home and raised a family.”21  Each of these claims attempts to adjudicate 
between certain moral or ideological positions, namely the right to individual 
achievement and rights unfairly won by non-citizens. 
In the models that follow, I attempt to measure the role of such ideological 
positions by using as a measure a seven point self placement on the liberal conservative 
scales.  Ideology is strongly correlated with every dependent variable, with conservative 
respondents marking that illegal immigration is more of a threat to jobs, the economy, 
culture, while rewarding lawbreakers and allowing terrorism.  Ideology has long been a 
                                                 
18 Buchanan, P. The Death of the West 2002 pg. 134 
19 George W. Bush, “Border Security and Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” Artesia, New Mexico 
Immigration Federal News Service June 6, 2006  
20 George W. Bush. “Immigration and Border Patrol” Laredo, Texas June 6, 2006  
21 George W. Bush. “Border Security and Comprehensive Immigration Reform,” Omaha, Nebraska June 6, 
2006  
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point of debate in race politics, with some arguing that it is in part a product of efforts “to 
legitimize the American racial hierarchy…” and further that ideological divisions are 
aligned by race and that controlling for it would amount to “overcontrolling” for the truly 
pervasive political effect of race.22  This being the case, controlling for ideology in a 
model should only lessen the strength of the coefficients in the models, allowing a 
conservative measure of the interactions terms in the regression model. 
 Ideology is obviously important, but how does it interact with non-racial 
variables?  Controlling for ideology, separating those who report any level of liberal, 
conservative and then independent, I ran an unweighted least squares regression with 
terrorism as the dependent variable.   All three divisions had statistically significant 
coefficients for the reponses to a question that ranked feeling toward illegal immigrants 
on a one to one hundred scales, a feeling thermometer.  Only liberals and independents 
had significant coefficients for the same thermometer response regarding people on 
welfare.  More interestingly, liberals and conservatives (but not independents) had 
significant coefficients for an index of political knowledge questions.  However, there is 
a sign difference, which understandably would be the case, given that ideology has more 
influence if there the respondent is more politically sophisticated. 
Political ideology, according to Peter Burns and James G. Gimpel, has a distinct 
role to play in explaining public opinion.   Ideology is a conceptual tool which links 
policy programs into a belief system.  “The terms "liberal" and "conservative" act as 
abstractions that define the poles on a continuum of favorable or unfavorable judgments 
about public policy alternatives.  Ideology provides political content for events that might 
                                                 
22 Sears, David O. and Henry, P.J. “Symbolic Racism: A Contemporary look” Advances in Experimental 
Psychology vol. 37 2005 Pg 142-143 
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otherwise be evaluated in nonpolitical terms.”  Those who are not “highly sophisticated 
reasoners” may be just expressing their feelings when marking off tendency toward liberal 
and conservative, rather than identifying agreement with extensive policy positions.23
I argue that those with ideological preference on the conservative/liberal scale will 
engage ideological filtering of affective response to Hispanics, turning racial affect into 
policy positions which correspond with relevant violations of that ideology.  I will refer to 
these phenomena as ideological mediation, distinct from symbolic racism theories that center 
on the Protestant ethic as I will explain later.  Further, this hypothesis of ethnic conflict, if 
properly formulated, holds more water than the Malthusian influenced realistic threat 
argument or the “security dilemma” framework described by Alexseev.  His analysis is 
that symbolic threat is a function of identity distinctiveness; the intruding groups 
population over the population of the non-foreign born within the society in question.   
The ideology in question for symbolic racism in the case of anti-black affect 
included notions of what the founding values that undergird American identity, in 
particular, values deemed valuable by the ‘conservative’ polity.  Nativism, often 
juxtaposed with racism, claims relative advantage as a feature of membership not of a 
race, but of an ethnicity with long standing power in a particular region.   
How these threats manifest themselves is mediated by ideological affiliations.  
When asked about terrorism, it seems that those without ideological affiliation do not 
have a statistically significant correlation between measures of anxiety and their 
estimation of whether there is an increased risk of terrorists or whether the solutions to 
                                                 
23 Peter Burns; James G. Gimpel “Economic Insecurity, Prejudicial Stereotypes, and Public Opinion on 
Immigration Policy” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 115, No. 2. (Summer, 2000), pp. 201-225 
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terrorism and illegal immigration are “completely different.”  Conversely, the anxiety of 
those with ideological affiliation does correlate with this question. 
 
Partial Correlation of Anxiety with Measures of 
Justifications           
  All   Conservatives   Liberals   Neutral   
  Correlation Significance Correlation Significance Correlation Significance Correlation Significance 
Law -0.0344 0.261 -0.0303 0.587 -0.0254 0.606 -0.0422 0.447 
Economy -0.0145 0.635 -0.0637 0.254 -0.0389 0.429 0.0312 0.574 
Jobs -0.0197 0.519 0.0015 0.979 -0.0441 0.370 -0.0097 0.862 
Terrorism -0.1184 0.000 -0.1782 0.001 -0.1158 0.018 -0.0706 0.204 
Culture -0.1667 0.000 -0.1857 0.001 -0.1369 0.005 -0.1795 0.001 
Partial Correlation of Disposition with Measures 
of Justifications           
  All   Conservatives   Liberals   Neutral   
  Correlation Significance Correlation Significance Correlation Significance Correlation Significance 
Law 0.0676 0.027 0.0692 0.218 0.0409 0.406 0.0894 0.108 
Economy 0.0564 0.066 0.0183 0.745 0.0808 0.100 0.0769 0.167 
Jobs 0.042 0.170 0.0332 0.554 0.0518 0.292 0.0415 0.457 
Terrorism -0.0334 0.275 0.026 0.643 -0.0469 0.341 -0.0352 0.528 
Culture 0.0149 0.627 -0.0446 0.427 0.0643 0.191 0.0182 0.745 
Partial Correlation of Aversion with Measures of 
Justifications           
  All   Conservatives   Liberals   Neutral   
  Correlation Significance Correlation Significance Correlation Significance Correlation Significance 
Law -0.1726 0.000 -0.1654 0.003 -0.1209 0.014 -0.2337 0.000 
Economy -0.0322 0.294 -0.0421 0.453 -0.0628 0.201 -0.0306 0.584 
Jobs -0.0533 0.082 -0.0377 0.502 -0.0696 0.156 -0.0645 0.247 
Terrorism 0.0124 0.685 0.0063 0.910 -0.0238 0.629 0.0246 0.659 
Culture -0.1699 0.000 -0.1869 0.001 -0.1773 0.000 -0.1305 0.019 
 
Regardless of ideology the correlates to anxiety about illegal immigration are well 
correlated with culture, on a level of p<.001 significance for conservatives, p<.005  
significance for liberals, and p<.001 significance for ideologically neutral.  The question 
implicated the positive nature of “diversity and richness of our culture” combined with a 
threat to break into separate cultures implicating the sort of balkanization that according 
to Alexseev drives the anti-immigrant sentiment.  These data indicate that of the reasons 
for having an immigration policy, the risk to culture and the risks of terrorism are more 
associated with affect toward the illegal immigrant population. 
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Psychologist Fred Pincus argues that there are three necessary requirements to 
trigger prejudice against a group or category of people. There must be a belief/ideology 
about that group, a triggering of emotions, and a motivation to behave a certain way 
toward that group.24  Is the prejudice against illegal immigrants initiated by racial 
prejudice, or is it the non-racial sentiment that there is a perceived fundamental 
unwillingness of illegal immigrants, particularly Hispanics, to assimilate?  It could be, as 
Alexseev argues, that rather than anti-Hispanic sentiment, it is the fear of the tearing apart 
of the fabric of American society which drives antiimmigrant policy.25  Professor 
Rodolfo O. de la Garza argues that there is good reason to think that racial affect is not 
driving the current immigration debates.  The debate crosses traditional racial lines, 
including even traditionally restrictionist republican interests finding new constituencies 
in Latinos and Asians as well as a mobilized chamber of commerce. 26 
We ought not to be glib with charges of ‘nativism’ or ‘racism.’  Those who 
support restrictionist measures concerning illegal immigration argue that such terms 
slander their motives and shut down legitimate debate about a non-racial security issue. 27   
They argue that their policies are neutral with regard to race, and that their principles 
apply evenly to all who break the law.  While being careful not to impugn legitimate 
concerns about security and economics, historically restrictionist sentiment correlates 
with ‘nativist’ or even blatantly racist prejudice.  I contend that it is important to ask 
                                                 
24 Race and Ethnic Conflict: Contending Views on Prejudice, Discrimination and Ethnoviolence  Fred L. 
Pincus & Howard J. Ehrlich eds., 1994 pg. 49-50
25 Bosniak, Linda S. “Nativism” The Concept some reflections”  Immigrants out The New Nativism and the 
Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States Edited by Juan F. Perea 1997  pg. 287
26 Rodolfo O. de la Garza Understanding Contemporary Immigration Debates: The Need for A 
Multidimensional Approach Jul 31, 2006 
 
27 Bosniak, Linda S. ibid pg 283
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whether such features are focusing even legitimate concerns about immigrant intentions 
to bring about the sort of security dilemmas as described by Alexseev. 
Taking as a starting point Kinder’s claim that “racial prejudice infects 
contemporary political affairs in pervasive ways,”28 in fact, principles (or values) are 
indispensable to adequate understanding of public opinion.  When testing opinions about 
race, we must be careful to take into account the principles of the respondents, which 
may influence policy preferences.  During the 1980s and 90s, political scientists debated 
the methodologies and principles behind measuring anti-black affect and its effect on 
policy.  Two important viewpoints in this debate are those who argue for a symbolic 
racism thesis and their critics, who charge that these phenomena are conflicts over 
principle, not racial affect.    
Symbolic racism theorists argue that because racism is no longer acceptable in the 
public square, anti-black affect presents through opposition to perceived violations of 
traditional values obtained from pre-adult socialization. These traditional values are 
“individualism and self-reliance, the work ethic, obedience, and discipline.”  Hard work 
and diligent service is juxtaposed against “unfair” government interference, which alters 
the social situations of blacks who have obtained their position because of ethical or 
disciplinary failures.29  The proponents of this theory argue that these traditional values 
act as symbols, or as a stand-in, for racial prejudice not openly expressed in the public 
sphere.  Symbolic racism theory holds that direct material interests such as job 
                                                 
28 Kinder, D. R. “The continuing American dilemma: White resistance to racial change 40 years after 
Myrdal” Journal of Social Issues 42, pg. 168  1986 
29 Kinder, D. R. and D. O. Sears (1981). Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good 
Life. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology 40: 414-31. 
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availability or strain on public resources do not alone determine the motives for political 
behavior.   
The critics of the symbolic racism thesis find that prejudice is one of many forces 
that underlie policy preference, and a majority of the preference can be explained by 
ideology.  Debates over race are actually debates over conservative and liberal values.30  
Sniderman tests for a “covert racism” in which values serve as a “pretext” for treating 
blacks less well than whites (Sniderman et al. 1991 430-434).31 He reasons that if the 
traditional values serve merely as a pretext, then symbolic racists would treat particularly 
harshly those blacks who violate traditional values.  A series of studies found that this 
was not the case, therefore symbolic racism theory would not hold.  My question is, then, 
what applicability do these concepts have for immigration? 
While symbolic racism comes from the traditional values embodied in the 
Protestant Ethic, opposition to immigration, illegal or not, does not obviously comport 
with notions that fall under these traditional values.32  While it is the case that 
immigration debates invoked government welfare, the direction is reversed, providing 
more for citizens rather then less.  Restrictions question whether there will be room left in 
hospitals or public schools for the native citizens, after distributing to the newly arrived 
migrant population.  This presupposes some level of appropriate government 
subsidization and responsibility toward the well-being of citizens that a purely 
conservative libertarian may not endorse.  Fears of general disorder and crime aside, 
                                                 
30 Sniderman, P. Peffley, M. Hurwitz, J., (1997) "Racial Stereotypes and Whites' Political Views of Blacks 
in the Context of Welfare and Crime." American Journal of Political Science. 41:30-60. 
31 Sniderman P. M., Piazza T., Tetlock P. E., and Kendrick, A. (1991). "The New Racism," American 
Journal of Political Science, 35: pp.423-447. 
32 Kinder, D. R. (1986) The continuing American dilemma: White resistance to racial change 40 years after Myrdal.  
Journal of Social Issues, 42, 151-171 
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other concerns about illegal immigrants, in particular failures to assimilate or contribute 
to the national identity are perhaps more communitarian ideals than the markedly 
individualistic ‘Protestant Ethic.’ 
Despite these potential differences in ideological background, claims in symbolic 
racist explanations of anti-black sentiment have parallels in immigration discourse.  
Much like the changed public sphere that no longer accepts openly racist ideology, 
immigration decisions based on the appearance of new immigrants or their race is not 
admitted when it once was.  In contrast to the 1920’s, when “racial inferiority” was a 
belief widely acknowledged by the media, today’s environment is not conducive to 
traditional nativism.33  This stated it is not that anti-Hispanic affect is not taking a toll; a 
1997 study concluded, “opinions concerning the economic effects of immigration are best 
regarded as an amalgam of material concerns and more purely affective responses to 
particular ethnic groups.” 34  Rather than policy that overtly prejudices immigrants, a 
symbolic racism hypothesis would predict prejudice expressed in defense of some set of 
conservative values seemingly unrelated to racial issues.  
Recent ballot proposals that respond to the illegal immigration threat in Arizona 
demonstrate the implicit link between a set of conservative ‘race neutral’ values and 
restrictionist immigration sentiment.  In this case, the conservative principles in question 
include such as restricting punitive damages from lawsuits, (litigation nation) and taking 
a hard line on crime.  Arizona’s Proposition 102 would prohibit a person who wins a civil 
lawsuit from receiving punitive damages if the person is present in this state in violation 
                                                 
33 Muller, Thomas Nativism in the Mid-1990’s Why Now? Immigrants out The New Nativism and the 
Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States Edited by Juan F. Perea 1997  pg.109
34 Citrin, Jack “Public Opinion toward Immigration Reform: The Role of economic Motivations,” Journal 
of Politics 59, no. 3 August 1997:876-77)
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of federal immigration law related to improper entry.  Further, Proposition 100 prohibits 
bail for any person who is charged with a “serious felony offense” if the person is found 
to have entered or stayed in the U.S. illegally.35   
While these positions are ideologically conservative, they do not seem, as with 
principled ideological stances on race, to stem from the ‘Protestant Ethic.’  These claims 
are culturally motivated, and may not even comport well with traditional political 
divisions.  One common sentiment among restrictionists is that illegal immigration, and 
those seeking liberalized borders, is encouraged and sanctioned by “big business.”  This 
sort of populist sentiment clashes with the conservative positions that endorse 
individualism and laissez-faire economics.  Such clashes contributed to the temporary 
“blow up” of Senator John McCain presidential campaign and may contribute to shifts on 
immigration policy by the other leading Republican candidates as well.36  These clashes 
will confound ideologies correlation with immigrant sentiment, especially when 
considering those who identify as conservatives.  
To test the ideology mediation hypothesis, I propose that there will be an 
intervening relationship between ideology and the thermometer responses relationship to 
the various rationalizations; jobs, terrorism, economy and most importantly, culture.  In 
these models, I have included three thermometer variables, ranging from 0 to 100: 
Hispanics, welfare recipients, and illegal immigrants.  A response of 0 is “cold” a 
response of 100 is “warm” toward the group.  The ideological leanings are distributed 
across a seven-point scale. 
                                                 
35 http://www.azleg.state.az.us/2006_Ballot_Proposition_Analyses/ 
 
36 Michael D. Shear Washington Post Staff Writer Immigration Stance Is Costly for McCain Thursday, 
June 28, 2007; Page A01 
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   Ideology      
Non-
Ideological 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Total 
0 0 0 0 315 0 0 0 315
1 56 171 162 0 128 185 36 738
Total  56 171 162 315 128 185 36 1,053 
 
The thermometer results for illegal immigrants were significant for all political 
leanings and for all dependent variables in the five regression models; however, there was 
a pattern in the thermometer response for Hispanics as follows: 
 
 
Thermometer response of 
Hispanics     
 All    Conservatives  
 Coefficient t value p> |t|  Coefficient t value p> |t| 
Jobs 0.0140 2.80 0.005 Jobs 0.0129 2.52 0.012 
Culture 0.0172 3.08 0.002 Culture 0.0202 2.43 0.016 
Law 0.0168 3.15 0.002 Law 0.0250 2.79 0.006 
Economy -0.0008 -0.16 0.876 Economy -0.0066 -0.87 0.385 
Terrorism 0.0067 1.28 0.200 Terrorism 0.0089 1.00 0.317 
 Liberal   
Politically 
neutral   
 Coefficient t value p> |t|  Coefficient t value p> |t| 
Jobs 0.022 2.42 0.016 Jobs 0.0035 0.38 0.706 
Culture 0.0247 2.39 0.018 Culture 0.0079 0.7 0.482 
Law 0.0212 2.36 0.019 Law 0.0052 0.49 0.624 
Economy 0.0155 1.61 0.109 Economy -0.0097 -0.92 0.356 
Terrorism 0.011 1.22 0.223 Terrorism -0.0002 -0.02 0.983 
 
 
 
 In these regressions, the coefficients on the variable relating thermometer 
responses about Hispanics and the dependent variables jobs, culture and law are 
statistically significant for those who measure themselves with a political ideology in 
either direction.   This was not the case for the economy variable or the terrorism 
variable, which did not have any statistically significant correlation with thermometer 
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results for Hispanics, regardless of ideological leaning.  For the former three variables, 
these data indicate that there is a mediating relationship between ideological questions 
and responses on thermometer ratings for Hispanics.   
 For those who do not self- identify with the conservative-liberal ideological 
divide, there is no correlation between anti-Hispanic affect and rationales for immigration 
positions.  These individuals would not necessarily have or not have any particular 
sentiment; but rather, they would be less likely to report such sentiment consistently if it 
corresponds with hard line policy positions on illegal immigration.   
Correlation of Anxiety with Thermometer 
reading on Hispanics 
 
Non-
Neutral Neutral
Pearsons Correlation -0.270 -0.143
Significance 0.000 0.009
N 758 335
 
While there is an equivocation in public opinion between illegal immigrants and 
Hispanics, these data imply that for those with neutral ideological tendencies there is a 
propensity to misrepresent anxiety of illegal immigrants with Hispanic affect in order to 
avoid the perception of racist policy advocacy.  Those with ideological leanings can filter 
anti-Hispanic affect into a coherent system of ethical and political claims that obscure the 
affective origins of the political rationales.  The respondents’ tendency to place such 
affect as adherence to a larger ideological system mitigates the tendency to misrepresent 
the extent of anti-Hispanic affect driving their policy preferences.  
 The statistically correct way to measure such an interaction is to use an interaction 
variable in the model itself.   For example, we take a new variable for whether the 
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respondent was ideological, 1 if they were, 0 if they had no ideological leanings, and 
multiply that with the thermometer response in the following model. 
Culture = thermometer for illegal aliens + thermometer for Hispanics + 
thermometer for illegal aliens * non-ideological + ideology + non-
ideological*Hispanic thermometer + age + Education + South + border 
state + treatment + Democrat + Republican + immigration knowledge + 
Estimate of illegal + Estimate of incoming illegal 
 
 
 
Regression printout to find Interaction 
effect on Culture   Number of obs= 1304 
    F( 15,  1288)=  63.56 
    Prob > F    = 0.0000 
     R-squared   = 0.4253 
     Adj R-squared=0.4187 
     Root MSE  =  2.8549   
          
  Coefficient 
Std. 
Error T P>|t| 
Illegal thermometer -0.07066 0.003742 -18.88 0.000
Hispanic thermometer -0.00145 0.006465 -0.22 0.823
Non-Ideological*Hispanic Therm  -0.0154 0.007575 -2.03 0.042
Ideology (seven point) 0.285359 0.065741 4.34 0.000
Ideologue (0 or 1) 0.901089 0.550516 1.64 0.102
Age 0.162856 0.056203 2.9 0.004
Education -0.41784 0.107384 -3.89 0.000
Live in South -0.11475 0.164651 -0.7 0.486
Live in Border state 0.380693 0.162453 2.34 0.019
Treatment 0.01699 0.167547 0.1 0.919
Democrat -0.6387 0.198246 -3.22 0.001
Republican 0.30217 0.220525 1.37 0.171
Knowledge of Illegal 
immigration -0.08025 0.066337 -1.21 0.227
Over-estimate of those here 0.17615 0.094856 1.86 0.064
Over-estimate of those coming 0.048468 0.07993 0.61 0.544
Constant 10.64918 0.716012 14.87 0.000
 
This model shows, in statistical terms, that there is a significant interaction effect 
between being non-ideological and the correlation of Hispanic thermometer responses 
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and culture.  The following partial derivative of the regression model with respect to the 
thermometer variable describes the effect of Hispanic thermometer responses on culture. 
neutralnon
rthermomete
Y −−−=∂
∂ *0154.00145.  
Non-ideologues, who will have a zero response in the model, will only have the 
statistically insignificant -.00145 as the effect.  Those with ideology, however, have a 
statistically significant .0154 unit decrease in the strength of the threat of culture for 
every 1-point increase in the warmth reported for Hispanics.  In other words, the more 
those with ideology like Hispanics, the less likely they are to respond that illegal 
immigration is a threat to culture, whereas the same is not the case for those who 
responded neutral on the ideology scale.  I argue that this is evidence for a psychological 
theory that racial prejudice infects contemporary political affairs in pervasive ways, but 
that this phenomena does not obtain in situations where there is not an ideological 
framework to sort affective responses into policy positions.  The following table outlines 
the coefficients for each of the relevant dependent rationales. 
 
 Effect of Thermometer responses on Reasons for Non-Neutrals 
    
 Effect Joint probability p> |t| 
rthermomete
Jobs
∂
∂
 
-0.01486 F(  2,  1288) =    6.06 Prob > F =    0.0024 
rthermomete
Culture
∂
∂
 
-0.01685 F(  2,  1288) = 6.43 Prob > F =    0.0017 
rthermomete
Law
∂
∂
 
-0.01502 F(  2,  1288) =    5.93  Prob > F =    0.0027 
rthermomete
Economy
∂
∂
 
-0.01382 F(  2,  1293) =    1.99 Prob > F =    0.1366 
rthermomete
Terrorism
∂
∂
 
-0.00414 F(  3,  1290) =    0.80 Prob > F =    0.4946 
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Noticing that this measurement of the effect of thermometer responses has the same 
significant variables for the dependent variables of Jobs, Culture and Law, and the same 
insignificant effects for the variables of the Economy and Terrorism variables as the 
previous separated group analysis.  The F tests for these effects was done on a joint 
hypothesis test because of high multicollinearity when testing for a variance inflation 
factor (Non-Ideology and the interaction term each a Variance Inflation Factor value 
>10).  These differences in the effects for different rationales do not comport with 
previous work dealing with African American racial policy, particularly Sniderman, 
Crosby and Howell, who found that prejudices’ interaction with ideology is uniform 
across racially implicated policies, rather than varying according to the policy area.37  
One explanation for the failure of the interaction variable to be significant for terrorism 
and economy is that the respondents did not consider the racial nature of these particular 
rationales.  A further finding of Sniderman, Crosby and Howell is that there should be 
disproportionate importance for racial affect for liberals, rather than conservatives, the 
former of whose policies are driven by a combination of ideology and racial affect.  
Rather, this model indicates that there is an interaction between ideology and affect, but 
that this difference may not be solely between liberals and conservatives as it was for the 
studies of African American aimed policy. 
 
                                                 
37 Sniderman, P.M. Crosby, G.C., Howell, W. G. “The Politics of Race” Racialized Politics 2000, eds.  
Sears, Sidanius, Bobo pg 236-237 
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PROBLEMS AND CONCLUSION 
 
One main concern one has whenever embarking on a study of racial affect and its 
relationship to policy is whether or not we can get respondents to demonstrate their actual 
beliefs of the matter, or whether the questions themselves interfere too much with getting 
objective access to the opinions of the respondents, something Sniderman et al. calls 
intrusiveness.  Besides measurement problems of racial affect, it may be difficult to 
separate in the minds of the average respondent the differences between anti-Hispanic 
affect and anti-illegal immigrant affect, where one may be read as the other, and a 
problem of endogeneity ensues.  The model attempts to fix some of this by including a 
variable for affect toward illegal immigration, albeit using a relatively crude thermometer 
response. 
 A second problem is the crudeness of the ideology measure.  With a seven-point 
scale, it is not clear what a “neutral” response means in relation to immigration debate's 
ideological issues.  A more substantive ideological measure may help adjudicate whether 
it is ideological sophistication or particular ideological positions captured by the non-
neutral responses that allow (or excuses) significant relationships between racial affect 
and the rationales associate with the risks of illegal immigration.  Nevertheless, as it 
stands, there is significant reason to think that ideology is not playing a straightforward 
role in this model. 
 Ideology, on my proposed hypothesis, subsidizes the search to cover the effect of 
racial affect on our policy.  Those without this cognitive tool are unable to dissociate their 
racial affect and their policy preferences, and are therefore less likely to have a 
significant correlation between their thermometer responses and their particular concerns 
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of illegal immigration.  The data indicates that with similar intensity, both liberals and 
conservatives use the tool of ideology that can place their racial affect in a system of 
beliefs on policy, resulting in what for them is policy that does not reflect their racial 
affect but rather their principled or reasoned reaction to real threat.   
While the data is not refined enough to explain the mechanism of this mediation 
in existing ideological systems, I propose that there are structural features of both sides of 
the ideological spectrum that may contribute.  Conservative ideology may criticize, for 
example, the unfairness in distribution of public goods to illegal immigrants who did not 
follow the laws of the land or worry about the government’s ability to protect the security 
of its citizens in favor of considerations of cultural or racial sensitivity.  Liberal ideology 
may have concerns about the abuse of workers by unlicensed and unregulated industry or 
abuses at the border itself by unscrupulous “coyotes.”  There are further concerns about 
wages of disadvantaged American workers or for privileging illegal immigrants over 
asylum seekers, both of which appeal to various facets of traditional liberal ideology.  
Compare the debate to that over free trade, as both Democratic candidates in the 2008 
primary sent out mailers denouncing each other’s presumed support for NAFTA.38  There 
are reasons on both sides of the ideological spectrum to be concerned about illegal 
immigration, and these reasons give room to express our attitudes, entering the public 
discourse in the form of principled policy positions. 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
38 New York Times “It must be Ohio” February 24, 2008 nytimes.com editorial 
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APPENDIX: 
 
PARTIAL CORRELATIONS TO SHOW PAIRINGS OF RATIONALES 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Corr.  0.303 0.282 0.185 0.194 0.036 0.005 -0.153 0.087 0.046
 Sig.  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.808 0.000 0.000 0.015 
2 Corr. 0.303  0.188 0.142 0.187 -0.033 0.002 0.002 0.098 0.054
 Sig. 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.081 0.930 0.904 0.000 0.005 
3 Corr. 0.282 0.188  0.246 0.304 0.033 0.018 0.088 0.087 -0.206
 Sig. 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.086 0.343 0.000 0.000 0.000 
4 Corr. 0.185 0.142 0.246  0.242 -0.014 -0.102 0.052 -0.009 0.109
 Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.470 0.000 0.006 0.636 0.000 
5 Corr. 0.194 0.187 0.304 0.242  0.023 0.039 0.085 -0.203 0.062
 Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.233 0.044 0.000 0.000 0.001 
6 Corr. 0.036 -0.033 0.033 -0.014 0.023  0.295 0.272 0.139 0.235
 Sig. 0.060 0.081 0.086 0.470 0.233  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
7 Corr. 0.005 0.002 0.018 -0.102 0.039 0.295  0.214 0.194 0.334
 Sig. 0.808 0.930 0.343 0.000 0.044 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
8 Corr. -0.153 0.002 0.088 0.052 0.085 0.272 0.214  0.154 0.255
 Sig. 0.000 0.904 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
9 Corr. 0.087 0.098 0.087 -0.009 -0.203 0.139 0.194 0.154  0.166
 Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.636 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 
10 Corr. 0.046 0.054 -0.206 0.109 0.062 0.235 0.334 0.255 0.166  
 Sig. 0.015 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
 
1 
Allowing any illegal immigrants to become citizens sets a bad precedent by 
rewarding people for breaking the law. 
2 
 
The government should not make things worse for those struggling economically by 
allowing millions of illegal immigrants to compete for jobs. 
3 
 
We cannot afford the taxes necessary to provide services like education and health 
care for illegal immigrants. 
4 
 
If illegal immigration trends continue, English will no longer be our common 
language. Without a common language, the U.S. will break into separate cultures. 
5 
 
The large flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. makes it easy for terrorists to 
enter the country unchallenged. 
6 
 
Most illegal immigrants are highly motivated people who contribute to the economy 
through hard work, often in jobs that citizens do not want. 
7 
 
America has always been a nation of immigrants, with each new wave adding to the 
diversity and richness of our culture. The most recent wave of immigrants is no 
different. 
8 
 
Allowing some illegal immigrants to eventually become citizens recognizes that most 
of them are otherwise law-abiding neighbors. 
9 
 
Terrorism and illegal immigration are completely different issues, with completely 
different solutions. 
10 
 
Illegal immigrants pay taxes like the rest of us, so they should be able to get 
services like education and health care. 
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QUESTION WORDING AND FORMULA 
 
LQ34: Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statement.  
 
1 agree - 7 disagree 
 
Variable = (8-A) + B  
 
Variable Name : Law  
 
A. Allowing any illegal immigrants to become citizens sets a bad precedent by rewarding 
people for breaking the law. 
 
B.  Allowing some illegal immigrants to eventually become citizens recognizes that most 
of them are otherwise law-abiding neighbors. 
 
Variable Name : Jobs 
 
A. The government should not make things worse for those struggling economically by 
allowing millions of illegal immigrants to compete for jobs. 
 
B.  Most illegal immigrants are highly motivated people who contribute to the economy 
through hard work, often in jobs that citizens do not want. 
 
Variable Name : Terrorism 
 
A.  The large flow of illegal immigrants into the U.S. makes it easy for terrorists to enter 
the country unchallenged. 
 
B.  Terrorism and illegal immigration are completely different issues, with completely 
different solutions. 
 
Variable Name : Economy 
 
A.  We cannot afford the taxes necessary to provide services like education and health 
care for illegal immigrants. 
 
B.  Please tell us how much you agree or disagree with the following statement. Illegal 
immigrants pay taxes like the rest of us, so they should be able to get services like 
education and health care. 
 
Variable Name : Culture 
 
A.  If illegal immigration trends continue, English will no longer be our common 
language. Without a common language, the U.S. will break into separate cultures. 
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B. America has always been a nation of immigrants, with each new wave adding to the 
diversity and richness of our culture. The most recent wave of immigrants is no 
different. 
 
 
 
